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Abstract
We consider a source-destination pair that can only communicate through an untrusted intermediate
relay node. The intermediate node is willing to employ a designated relaying scheme to facilitate reliable
communication between the source and the destination. Yet, the information it relays needs to be kept
secret from it. In this two-hop communication scenario, where the use of the untrusted relay node is
essential, we find that a positive secrecy rate is achievable. The center piece of the achievability scheme
is the help provided by either the destination node with transmission capability, or an external “good
samaritan” node. In either case, the helper performs cooperative jamming that confuses the eavesdropping
relay and disables it from being able to decipher what it is relaying. We next derive an upper bound on
the secrecy rate for this system. We observe that the gap between the upper bound and the achievable
rate vanishes as the power of the relay node goes to infinity. Overall, the paper presents a case for
intentional interference, i.e., cooperative jamming, as an enabler for secure communication.
This work was presented in part at the IEEE Globecom Conference, December 2008. This work is supported in part by the
National Science Foundation with Grants CCR-0237727, CCF-051483, CNS-0716325, CNS-0721445 and the DARPA ITMANET
Program with Grant W911NF-07-1-0028.
2I. INTRODUCTION
Information theoretic security was proposed by Shannon [1]. The idea of measuring secrecy
using mutual information lends itself naturally to the investigation of how the channel can influ-
ence secrecy and further to the characterization of the fundamental limit of secure transmission
rate. Wyner, in [2], defined the wiretap channel, and showed that secure communication from
a transmitter to a “legitimate” receiver is possible when the signal received by the wiretapper
(eavesdropper) is degraded with respect to that received by the legitimate receiver. Reference [3]
identified the secrecy capacity of the general discrete memoryless wiretap channel. The secrecy
capacity of the Gaussian wiretap channel is found in [4].
Recent progress in this area has extended classical information theory channel models to
include secrecy constraints. Examples are the multiple access channel, the broadcast channel,
the two-way channel, the three-node relay channel and the two-user interference channel [5]–
[13]. These studies are beginning to lead to insights for designing secure wireless communication
systems from the physical layer up. Prominent such examples include using multiple antennas to
steer the transmitted signal away from an eavesdropper [14]–[16], transmitting with the intention
of jamming the eavesdropper [8], [10], [17], and taking advantage of variations in channel state
to provide secrecy [18]–[20].
The focus of this work is on a class of relay networks where the source and the destination
have no direct link and thus can only communicate utilizing an intermediate relay node. This
models the practical scenario where direct communication between the source and the destination
is too “expensive” in terms of power consumption: Direct communication may be used to send
some very low rate control packages, for example to initialize the communication, but it is
infeasible to sustain a non-trivial reliable communication rate due to the power constraint.
In such a scenario, the source-destination pair needs the relay to communicate. On the other
hand, more often than not, this relay node may be “untrusted” [11]. This does not mean the relay
node is malicious, in fact quite the opposite, it may be part of the network and we will assume
that it is willing to faithfully carry out the designated relaying scheme. The relay simply has a
lower security clearance in the network and hence is not trusted with the confidential message it
is relaying. Equivalently, we can assume the confidential message is one used for identification
of the source node for authentication, which should never be revealed to a relay node in order
3not to be vulnerable to an impersonation attack. In all these cases, we must assume there is an
eavesdropper co-located at the relay node when designing the system.
The “untrusted” relay model, or the eavesdropper being co-located with the relay node, was
first studied in [9] for the general relay channel, with a rather pessimistic outlook, finding that
for the degraded or the reversely degraded relay channel the relay node should not be deployed.
More optimistic results for the relay channel with a co-located eavesdropper have been identified
recently in references [11], [21], [22]. Specifically, it has been shown that the cooperation from
the relay may, in fact, be essential to achieving non-zero secrecy rate [11], [21]. The model is
later extended to the more symmetric case in [23], [24] where the relay also has a confidential
message of its own, which must be kept secret from the destination.
All these models assume that a direct link between the source and the destination is present
including our previous work [11]. In contrast, when there is no direct link, it is impossible for
this network to convey a confidential message from the source to the destination while keeping it
secret from the relay [9]. This is because the destination can only receive signals from the relay
resulting in a physically degraded relay channel [25]. Therefore, the relay knows everything the
destination knows regarding the confidential message, and the secrecy capacity is zero.
The differentiating feature of the model studied in this work from those described above
including [11] is that the destination has transmission capability. This opens the possibility of
the destination node to actively participate in ensuring the secrecy of the information it wants
to obtain. In an effort to address a practical two-hop communication scenario, we shall consider
each node to be half-duplex, which leads to a two-phase communication model. In addition,
feedback to the source is not considered in the channel model. Interestingly, in this model, the
transmission capability of the destination proves to be the enabler of secure communication.
By recruiting the help of the destination to do “cooperative jamming”, positive secrecy rate
can be achieved that would not have been possible otherwise. We also remark that in case the
transmission by the destination is not possible or desired, the help from an external cooperative
jammer will do as well.
The idea of using a helpful jammer goes back to [17], [26], [27] and has since been used
in many different models. Besides the multiple access, two-way [8] and relay wiretap channels
[10], other recent results that use “cooperative jamming” as the part of the achievability scheme
include [28]–[30]. In [28], a separate jammer is added to the classical Gaussian wiretap channel
4model. The jamming signal is revealed to the legitimate receiver via a wired link so that an
advantage over the eavesdropper is gained. Reference [30] does not assume the wired connection,
and employs a scheme tantamount to the two user multiple access channel with an external
eavesdropper where one of the users perform cooperative jamming. Reference [29] considers
the case where both the eavesdropper and the legitimate receiver observes a modulus Λ channel
and the destination carries out the jamming. We note that all these works deal with an external
eavesdropper, in contrast to the focus of this work, which is an untrusted (but legitimate) node
in the network.
In general, the optimality of recruiting a helpful jammer remains open as the converse results
are limited. For the Gaussian case, the main difficulty is to find a upper bound for which the
optimal input distribution can be found and evaluated. Doing so usually involves the introduction
of genie information, as in the converse for the Gaussian wiretap channel [4], MIMO wiretap
channel [14] and MAC wiretap channel [31]. The proofs then typically invoke the entropy power
inequality, as in [4], or the generalized entropy power inequality, as in [32].
In this work, we derive a computable upper bound for the model in consideration by first
introducing a second eavesdropper, an approach first used for a three-node relay channel in [11].
Next, after several steps of genie arguments, the channel is transformed into a wiretap channel
with a helpful jammer, whose outer bound is then evaluated. The resulting bound is non-trivial in
the sense that it is strictly tighter than the bound for the same channel without secrecy constraints.
We also prove that it is tighter than an upper bound derived using the generalized entropy power
inequality following a similar approach to [32], when the maximum sum received SNR at the
relay is greater than 0dB. We show that the gap between the bound and the achievable rates
converges to zero when the power of the relay goes to ∞.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II presents the channel model and the two-phase
protocol that utilizes cooperative jamming. In section III, we derive the achievable rates. Section
IV presents our upper bound and compares with other known upper bounds. Section V presents
the numerical results. Finally, Section VI presents the conclusion.
The following notation is used throughout this work: We use H to denote the entropy, h to
denote the differential entropy, and εk to denote any variable that goes to 0 when n goes to ∞.
We define C(x) = 1
2
log2(1 + x).
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Fig. 1. Two-hop communication using an untrusted relay
II. CHANNEL MODEL
The system model is shown in Figure 1. We assume all nodes are half-duplex and the
communication alternates between two phases, called phase one and phase two respectively.
During phase one, shown with solid lines in Figure 1, the source transmits signal X1. At the
same time, the destination node transmits jamming signal X2 in order to confuse the relay node.
The signal received by the relay in phase one, Y1, is given by
Y1 = X1 +X2 + Z1 (1)
where Z1 is a zero mean Gaussian random variable with unit variance. In an effort to reflect on
the design of a practical system, we assume that the computation of Xi, i = 1, 2 does not rely
on the signals received by node i in the past.
In phase two, shown with dashed lines, the relay transmits signal Xr, which is computed from
the local randomness at the relay, the signal transmitted and received by the relay in the past.
The signal received by the destination in phase two is denoted by Y2, which is given below:
Y2 = Xr + Z2 (2)
where Z2 is a zero mean Gaussian random variable with unit variance.
The channel alternates between these two phases according to a random or deterministic
schedule, which is generated by a global controller independently from the signals associated
with the channel model. Hence here the term “schedule” is simply a finite number of channel
uses which are either marked as phase one or phase two. We use n to denote the number of
channel uses marked as phase one, and m to denote the number of channel uses marked as phase
two. It should be noted that in general the n channel uses of phase one are not consecutive.
Neither are the m channel uses of phase two. We assume the schedule is stable, in the sense
6that the following limit exists:
α = lim
n+m→∞
n
m+ n
(3)
For a given α, we use {T (α)} to denote a sequence of schedules with increasing number of
channel uses n+m such that (3) holds. According to this definition, α becomes the limit of the
time sharing factor of phase one in the schedule T (α) as n+m→∞.
When transmitting signals, the source, the destination, and the relay must satisfy certain power
constraints. The average power constraints for the source, the jammer and the relay can be
expressed as follows:
1
N
N∑
k=1
E
[
X2i,k
]
≤ P¯i, i = 1, 2 (4)
1
N
N∑
k=1
E
[
X2r,k
]
≤ P¯r (5)
where
N = n+m (6)
is the total number of channel uses.
For the purpose of completeness, we also introduce the notation Pi, i = 1, 2 to denote the
average power of node i during phase one. Since node 1 and 2 are only transmitting during
phase one, Pi and P¯i are related as
Pi =
P¯i
α
, i = 1, 2 (7)
Similarly, we use Pr to denote the average power of the relay node during phase two. Since the
relay node only transmits during the second phase, Pr is related to P¯r as follows:
Pr =
P¯r
1− α (8)
After a number of phases, the destination node (node 2) decodes a message Wˆ from the signals
it transmitted during the periods of phase one and the signals it received during the periods of
phase two. For reliable communication, Wˆ should equal the message W from the source node
with high probability. Hence we have the following requirement:
lim
n+m→∞
Pr(W 6= Wˆ ) = 0 (9)
7The message W must also be kept secret from the eavesdropper at the relay node, who can
infer the value of W based on the following knowledges available to it:
1) The local randomness at the relay, denoted by A.
2) The n signals the relay transmitted during the periods of phase one, denoted by Y n1 .
3) The m signals the relay transmitted during the periods of phase two, denoted by Xmr .
The information on W that the eavesdropper can extract from these knowledges should be
limited. Hence we have the following secrecy constraint.
lim
n+m→∞
1
n+m
H (W ) = lim
n+m→∞
1
n +m
H (W |Xmr , Y n1 , A) (10)
Since W − {Xmr , Y n1 } −A is a Markov chain, we have
lim
n+m→∞
1
n+m
H (W |Xmr , Y n1 , A) = limn+m→∞
1
n +m
H (W |Xmr , Y n1 ) (11)
Therefore, the secrecy constraint can be expressed as
lim
n+m→∞
1
n +m
H (W ) = lim
n+m→∞
1
n+m
H (W |Xmr , Y n1 ) (12)
For a given α, and sequences of schedule {T (α)}, the secrecy rate Re is defined as
Re = lim
n+m→∞
1
n+m
H (W ) (13)
such that (9) and (12) are fulfilled. When deriving achievable rate, we will focus on a specific
sequence of schedules {T (α)}, and maximize the secrecy rate over α. When deriving the upper
bound, we will consider all possible sequences of {T (α)}.
Remark 1: Since the signals transmitted by node 1 and 2 do not depend on the signals they
received in the past, W → Y n1 → Xmr is a Markov chain. Therefore:
lim
n+m→∞
1
n+m
H (W |Xmr , Y n1 ) = limn+m→∞
1
n +m
H (W |Y n1 ) (14)
Hence, the following secrecy constraint can be used instead:
lim
n+m→∞
1
n+m
H (W ) = lim
n+m→∞
1
n +m
H (W |Y n1 ) (15)
Remark 2: We observe that in the system model shown in Figure 1, the destination, as the
sender of the jamming signal during the periods of phase one, has perfect knowledge of this
signal. This can be viewed as a special case of the model shown in Figure 2, where the destination
only has a noisy copy of the jamming signal YJ = X2 +ZJ . If the jamming signal is corrupted
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Fig. 2. Two-hop network with an external cooperative jammer, CJ
by a noise sequence ZJ that is independent of the noise sequences at the other receivers, then
the secrecy capacity of the model in Figure 2 can not be larger than the secrecy capacity of
the model in Figure 1. This is because giving this noise sequence to the destination as genie
information would simply reveal the jamming signal X2 to it. Therefore, any upper bound we
derive for Figure 1 is also an upper bound for Figure 2. ✷
Remark 3: An apparent vulnerability of the described two phase protocol is that the destination
may not be aware that the source has initiated its transmission. In this case, without the protection
of the jamming signal from the destination, the message from the source would be revealed to
the relay node and hence compromised. To prevent this from happening, proper initialization of
the protocol is necessary. ✷
III. ACHIEVABLE RATE
In this section, we derive the achievable secrecy rate with the following sequence of deter-
ministic periodic schedules:
The channel alternates between n′ channel uses for phase one and m′ channel uses for phase
two, where n′ and m′ are two positive integers. The alternation takes M times. Hence n = n′M
and m = m′M . For a given α, the sequence of schedules is obtained by letting M,n′, m′ →∞
and
lim
n′,m′→∞
n′
m′ + n′
= α (16)
With this sequence of schedules, we have the following theorem:
9Theorem 1: The following secrecy rate is achievable for the model in Figure 1:
0 ≤ R ≤ max
0≤P ′
1
≤P¯1/α,0<α<1
α
[
C
(
P ′1
(1 + σ2c )
)
− C
(
P ′1
(1 + P2)
)]+
(17)
where σ2c is the variance of the Gaussian quantization noise determined by:
αC
(
P ′1 + 1
σ2c
)
= (1− α)C (Pr) (18)
where P2 is defined in (7), Pr is defined in (8).
Proof: The proof is given in Appendix A.
Remark 4: It can be seen from (17) that, for any fixed time sharing factor α the relay should
always transmit at maximum power Pr. However, the optimal transmission power of the source
may be less than P1. This can be seen as follows: For a given jamming power P2, the achievable
rate is not a monotonically increasing function of P ′1. This is because, if P ′1 → 0 or P ′1 → ∞,
Re → 0, indicating that even if the source power budget is ∞, the optimal transmission power
is actually finite. Let this value be P ∗1 . P ∗1 may or may not fall into the interval [0, P1], which
is the range of power consumption allowed for phase one. If it does, then the source should
transmit with power P ∗1 rather than P1. If not, then the corresponding optimal value needs to be
determined. ✷
Remark 5: If the power constraint of the relay P¯r →∞, then σ2c → 0, α→ 1. The achievable
rate converges to
C(P¯1)− C( P¯1
1 + P¯2
) (19)
✷
IV. UPPER BOUND
In this section, we derive an upper bound for the secrecy rate.
We first need to determine the optimal schedule. It turns out that it is easy to find: We simply
let the first n channel uses be phase one, and the remaining m channel uses be phase two. The
optimality of this schedule can be proved as following:
Suppose a different schedule is used. Since the signals received in the past are not used for
encoding purposes at node 1 and 2, we can always move the channel uses of phase one to
the front without affecting the signals transmitted by these two nodes. On the other hand, we
notice that the relay can only use signals received in the past to compute its transmission signals.
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Fig. 4. Two-eavesdropper channel
However, during phase one, the relay only receives signals. Since moving phase one ahead only
means the relay could receive signals sooner, doing so will not limit the capability of the relay
to calculate its transmitted signals. Consequently, we observe that no matter what schedule is
used to achieve a secrecy rate, we can always modify this schedule such that all channel uses
of phase one are ahead of those of phase two and still achieve the same secrecy rate. Hence in
the following we only consider the optimal schedule.
We also observe we can transform the channel into the one shown in Figure 3. The jammer
and the receiver are now drawn separately, since the jammer does not use the signal received in
the past to compute the jamming signal. Note that Figure 3 is similar to Figure 12 used in the
achievability proof except that the dimension of the signals is changed from m′, n′ to m,n.
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We next leverage a technique first used in [11], [22] to derive the upper bound. Specifically,
the upper bound is obtained via the following transformations:
1) First, we add a second eavesdropper to the channel, as shown by Figure 4. Its received
signal is denoted by Ye and over n channel uses Y ne is given by:
Y ne = X
n
1 +X
n
2 + Z
n
e (20)
Here Zne is a Gaussian noise with the same distribution as Zn1 . Zne can be arbitrarily
correlated with Zn1 . Since
Y n1 = X
n
1 +X
n
2 + Z
n
1 (21)
We have
Pr(W,Y ne ) = Pr(W,Y
n
1 ) (22)
Therefore
H (W |Y ne ) = H (W |Y n1 ) (23)
From (15), this means
lim
n+m→∞
1
m+ n
H(W ) = lim
n+m→∞
1
m+ n
H(W |Y ne ) (24)
Hence the message W is kept secret from the second eavesdropper. This means, for a given
coding scheme that achieves secrecy rate in Figure 3, the same secrecy rate is achievable
with the introduction of this additional eavesdropper.
2) Next, we remove the first eavesdropper at the relay. Doing so will not decrease secrecy
rate either, since we have one less secrecy constraint.
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From (24), the secrecy rate can be upper bounded via H(W |Y ne ). To do that, we provide the
signal Xmr to the destination by a genie. Similarly, the signal Xn2 is revealed to both the relay
and the destination. H(W |Y ne ) is then bounded by:
H (W |Y ne )
≤H (W |Y ne )−H (W |Xmr Y m2 Xn2 ) + nε (25)
=H (W |Y ne )−H (W |Xmr Xn2 ) + nε (26)
≤H (W |Y ne )−H (W |Y n1 Xmr Xn2 ) + nε (27)
=H (W |Y ne )−H (W |Y n1 Xn2 ) + nε (28)
=H (W |Y ne )−H (W |Xn1 + Zn1 ) + nε (29)
≤H (W |Y ne )−H (W |Y ne , Xn1 + Zn1 ) + nε (30)
The genie information Xmr causes the signal Y m2 to be useless to the relay, as shown by (25)-
(26). (28) is due to the fact that once the signal received by the relay Y n1 is given, the signal
transmitted by the relay Xmr , which is computed from Y n1 , is independent from the jamming
signal Xn2 and the confidential message W . Finally, revealing the genie information Xn2 to
the relay and the destination essentially removes the influence of the jamming signal from the
relay link, as shown by (28)-(30). These are essentially a consequence of the link noises being
independent. The resulting channel is equivalent to the one shown in Figure 5, and can be viewed
as a special case of the channel in [8], [33]. Similar techniques to those in [31], [33] can be
used here to bound the secrecy rate. Let Y˜ nr = Xn1 + Zn1 . Then (30) becomes:
H (W |Y ne )−H
(
W |Y ne Y˜ nr
)
(31)
=I
(
W ; Y˜ nr |Y ne
)
(32)
≤I
(
WXn1 ; Y˜
n
r |Y ne
)
(33)
=I
(
Xn1 ; Y˜
n
r |Y ne
)
(34)
=h
(
Y˜ nr |Y ne
)
− h (Zn1 |Xn2 + Zne ) (35)
≤h
(
Y˜ nr |Y ne
)
− h (Zn1 |Xn2 + Zne , Xn2 ) (36)
=h
(
Y˜ nr |Y ne
)
− h (Zn1 |Zne ) (37)
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Here (34) follows from the fact that Xn1 determines W . The first term in (37) is maximized
when Xn1 and Xn2 are i.i.d. Gaussian sequences [14]. Let the variance of each component of Xni
be Pi = P¯i/α, i = 1, 2. Let ρ be the correlation factor between Z1 and Ze. Then (37) is equal to
n
2
log2
(P1 + 1) (P1 + P2 + 1)− (P1 + ρ)2
(P1 + P2 + 1) (1− ρ2) (38)
It can be verified that, for any fixed ρ, equation (37) is an increasing function of P1 and P2.
Therefore, the upper bound is maximized with maximum average power. Equation (38) can then
be tightened by minimizing it over ρ. The optimal ρ is given below:
2P1 + P1P2 + P2 −
√
A
2P1
(39)
where
A = 4P2P
2
1 + 4P2P1 + P
2
2P
2
1 + 2P
2
2P1 + P
2
2
(40)
As a result, we have the following theorem:
Theorem 2: The secrecy rate of the channel in Figure 12 is upper bounded by
max
0<α<1
min
{
α
2
log2
(P1 + 1) (P1 + P2 + 1)− (P1 + ρ)2
(P1 + P2 + 1) (1− ρ2) , (1− α)C(Pr)
}
(41)
where ρ is given by (39). P1 = P¯1/α, P2 = P¯2/α, and Pr = P¯r/(1− α) are the average power
constraints of node 1, 2 and the relay for the time sharing factor α.
Remark 6: If we further fix P¯2 , and let P¯r, P¯1 → ∞, then α → 1. ρ converges to ρ¯ given
by:
ρ¯ = 1 + P¯2/2−
√
P¯2 + P¯ 22 /4 (42)
The difference of the upper bound and the achievable rate converges to
C
(
P¯2 + (ρ¯− 1)2
1− ρ¯2
)
− C
(
P¯2
)
(43)
We observe that the difference is only a function of P¯2. By comparison, the gap between the
achievable rate and the trivial upper bound C(P¯1) is C( P¯11+P¯2 ), which is unbounded. ✷
Remark 7: If we instead fix P¯2 = βP¯1, and let P¯r → ∞, then α → 1. The achievable rate
converges to (19). In this case, if we further let P¯1 → ∞, the upper bound given by (41)
converges to
C(P¯1)− C(1/β) (44)
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Comparing it with (19), we observe the difference of the upper bound and the achievable rate
converges to 0. Hence, in this case, our upper bound is asymptotically tight. ✷
Remark 8: The first term in the bound (41) is strictly smaller than the trivial bound αC(P1)
obtained by removing the secrecy constraints. To show that, simply let ρ = 0. (41) becomes
αC (P1) +
α
2
log2
1 + P1
(P1+1)(P2+1)
1 + P1
(P2+1)
(45)
The second term in (45) is always negative. ✷
A. Comparison with the bound derived with generalized Entropy Power Inequality
Recently the generalized entropy power inequality [34] was used to derive a computable upper
bound for the Gaussian multiple access channel with secrecy constraints [32]. Here the same
technique is applicable and another computable upper bound for the model in Figure 1 can
be derived. It is of interest to know which bound is tighter. Next, we prove that as long as
P1 + P2 > 1, this upper bound is always looser than the bound given by (38)-(39).
First, we briefly describe the derivation of the bound based on the approach in [32]:
H (W |Y n1 )
(a)
=H (W |Y n1 )−H (W |Y n1 Xn2 ) + nε (46)
=I (W ;Xn2 |Y n1 ) + nε (47)
≤I (WXn1 ;Xn2 |Y n1 ) + nε (48)
=I (Xn1 ;X
n
2 |Y n1 ) + nε (49)
Here step (a) follows from Fano’s inequality. (49) can be written as:
I (Xn1 ; Y
n
1 |Xn2 ) + I (Xn1 ;Xn2 )− I (Xn1 ; Y n1 ) + nε (50)
(b)
=I (Xn1 ; Y
n
1 |Xn2 )− I (Xn1 ; Y n1 ) + nε (51)
=h (Xn1 + Z
n
1 ) + h (X
n
2 + Z
n
1 )− h (Zn1 )− h (Xn1 +Xn2 + Zn1 ) + nε (52)
Step (b) follows from Xn1 , Xn2 being independent.
Next, like [32, (76)], we invoke the inequality from [34] and obtain
2
2
n
h(Xn1 +Xn2 +Zn1 ) ≥ 2
2
n
h(Xn1 +Zn1 ) + 2
2
n
h(Xn2 +Zn1 )
2
(53)
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Hence (52) can be upper bounded with
h (Xn1 + Z
n
1 ) + h (X
n
2 + Z
n
1 )−
n
2
log2
(
2
2
n
h(Xn1 +Zn1 ) + 2
2
n
h(Xn2 +Zn1 )
)
+
n
2
log2 (2) (54)
This expression is maximized when Xn1 , Xn2 are chosen to be i.i.d. Gaussian sequences. Dividing
by the total number of channel uses n+m, the final expression of the upper bound is given by
α
2
log2
(
2(P1 + 1) (P2 + 1)
P1 + P2 + 2
)
(55)
Remark 9: Note that (55) is also tighter than the bound αC(P1) when P1 > P2. Hence it is
a nontrivial bound when P1 > P2. ✷
Remark 10: When P¯r → ∞, then α → 1, Pi → P¯i, i = 1, 2. Comparing (19) with (55), the
gap between the achievable rates and the bound given by (55) is
1
2
log2
(
1 +
P¯1 + P¯2
2 + P¯1 + P¯2
)
(56)
which is smaller than 0.5 bit/channel use. ✷
We next show that for any given α, if P1+P2 > 1, (55) is always bigger than the first term in
(41). We omit the time sharing factor α in the front since they are present in both expressions.
Then we pick ρ such that
1− ρ2 = P1 + P2 + 2
2 (P1 + P2 + 1)
(57)
Note that this is a valid choice for ρ since the right hand side is within the interval (0, 1). Then
equation (41), after canceling α in the front, becomes
1
2
log2
2
(
(P1 + 1) (P1 + P2 + 1)− (P1 + ρ)2
)
P1 + P2 + 2
(58)
Hence we only need to verify that (55) is greater than (58) when P1+P2 > 1. This is equivalent
to verifying
(P1 + 1) (P2 + 1) > (P1 + 1) (P1 + P2 + 1)− (P1 + ρ)2 (59)
Or (2ρ− 1)P1+ρ2 > 0. A sufficient condition for this to hold is to require 2ρ−1 > 0. Substitute
(57) into this requirement we get P1 + P2 > 1.
Remark 11: Since the gap between the achievable rates and the bound given by (55) is
bounded by 0.5 bit/channel use when P¯r → ∞, the gap between the achievable rates and
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the bound given by (41) is also bounded by 0.5 bit/channel use when P¯r →∞ and P¯1+ P¯2 > 1.
Note that since when P¯r → ∞ we have α → 1, the condition P1 + P2 > 1 is equivalent to
P¯1 + P¯2 > 1. ✷
Remark 12: For the case that P1+P2 < 1, it is not clear between (55) and (41) which bound
is tighter. However, for these cases, the secrecy capacity is so small that the bounds are of no
consequence. ✷
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS
Relay’s Power Jammer’s Power α
Fig. 6 ∞ Proportional optimal
Fig. 7 ∞ Fixed optimal
Fig. 8 Limited Proportional 0.5
Fig. 9 Limited Fixed 0.5
Fig. 10 Limited Proportional optimal
Fig. 11 Limited Fixed optimal
TABLE I
SCENARIOS CONSIDERED IN THE NUMERICAL RESULTS
Shown in Table I are the six cases of interest, corresponding to different power budgets of the
relay and the jammer and whether time sharing factor α is fixed. We included the cases with
fixed time sharing factor because in a real system, for simplicity the time sharing factor may
not be dynamically adjusted according to power budgets. The numerical result of each case is
shown in the figures listed in the table. We stress that, though not explicitly considered in the
numerical results, for the more general case where the cooperative jammer is external, as shown
in Figure 2, the upper bound still holds, but the gap between the upper bound and achievable
rates would be wider.
Figures 6 and 7 demonstrate the asymptotic behavior described in Remark 6 when the power
of relay goes to ∞. Note that in this case the optimal time sharing factor α converges to 1.
Figures 8 and 9 demonstrate the case where the power the relay is finite, and the time sharing
factor α is fixed. In all four cases, we observe the upper bound is close to the achievable rate
when relay’s power is larger than the power of the source and the jammer. In this region, typically,
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Fig. 6. Secrecy Rate, Pr → ∞, P2 = 0.5P1, optimal α
the achievable rate increases linearly with the source SNR. In Figure 6, the gap between the
upper bound and achievable rate goes to zero as P1 →∞. In Figure 7, the upper bound almost
coincides with the achievable rate. The gap, given by (43), equals 9.98× 10−4 bits/channel use.
Also shown in each figure is the cut-set bound without secrecy constraints. The improvement
provided by the new bounds depends on the power budget. In general, the improvement is small
if the power of the jammer is large. Note that since we have normalized all channel gains
and included them into the power constraint, the power budget difference can be considered a
consequence of the difference in link gains.
Figure 9 also illustrates the power control problem described in Remark 4. Without power
control at the source node, the achievable rate will eventually decrease to zero. Note that this
behavior crystallizes only when the relay’s power is limited.
Finally, in Figure 10 and Figure 11, we compare the achievable rates and the upper bound
when each are maximized over the time sharing factor α. The gap between the upper bound
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Fig. 7. Secrecy Rate, Pr → ∞, P2 = 30dB, optimal α
and the achievable rate is now wider because the second term in the upper bound (41) is the
same as the upper bound without secrecy constraint. The role played by the second term (41)
becomes significant when the bound is optimized over the time sharing factor, which as pointed
out in [35], has a tendency to balance the two terms in the bound (41). However, as shown
in these figures, compared to the upper bound without secrecy constraints, the new bound still
offers significant improvement.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have considered a relay network without a direct link, where relaying is
essential for the source and the destination to communicate despite the fact that the relay node
is untrusted. Imposing secrecy constraints at the relay node, contrary to the previous work, we
have shown that a nonzero secrecy rate is indeed achievable. This is accomplished by enlisting
the help of the destination (or another dedicated node) who transmits to jam the relay, and uses
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the jamming signal as side information. We have derived an upper bound for the secrecy rate
with the assumption that no feedback is used for encoding at the source or destination. The new
upper bound is strictly tighter than the upper bound without secrecy constraints. We have also
proved that it is tighter than an upper bound derived from generalized entropy power inequality
when the maximum sum received SNR at the relay is greater than 0dB. The gap between the
bound and the achievable rates converges to 0 when the power of the transmitter, the relay and
the jammer goes to ∞. Numerical results show that our upper bound is in general close to the
achievable rate, and is indistinguishable from it for a fixed time sharing factor with a relay whose
power is in abundance.
In this work, we considered the case where the source or the jammer does not make use of the
relay transmission for encoding purposes. An upper bound for the secrecy rate when feedback
is used is recently found in [36]. A gap exists between the upper bound and the achievable rate
in [36], which is bounded by 0.5bit per channel use but does not vanish when the power of the
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Fig. 9. Secrecy Rate, Pr = 30dB, P2 = 40dB, α = 0.5
transmitter, the relay and the jammer goes to ∞. By comparison, the bound presented in this
work is asymptotically tighter in this case.
We conclude by reiterating that our findings in this paper presents cooperative jamming as an
enabler for secrecy from an internal eavesdropper, and motivates further investigation of such
cooperation ideas in more general settings including those in larger networks. We also comment
whether and when cooperative jamming actually yields the secrecy capacity (region) for various
multiuser channels remain open problems in information theory.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF THEOREM 1
We first introduce several supporting results used in proving Theorem 1.
In reference [11], [21], we presented the following achievable secrecy rate for a general relay
channel:
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Theorem 3: Consider a relay network with conditional distribution p(Y, Yr|X,Xr), with X ,
Xr being the input from the source and the relay respectively, and Yr,Y being the signals received
by the relay and the destination respectively. For the distribution
p(X)p(Xr)p(Y, Yr|X,Xr)p(Yˆr|Yr, Xr) (60)
the following range of rates R is achievable.
0 ≤ R < [I
(
X ; Y Yˆr|Xr
)
− I (X ; Yr|Xr)]+ (61)
with
I(Xr; Y ) > I(Yˆr; Yr|Y Xr) (62)
Theorem 3 follows from the achievable equivocation region given in [11, Theorem 1] by simply
considering rates R that equal the equivocation rate Re. The proof of Theorem 3 is given in
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[11]. The outline of the achievable scheme is as follows: The relay does compress-and-forward
as described in [25]. Therefore, as in [25], Xr is independent from X in the input distribution
expression (60). The same decoder in [25] is used at the destination. The same codebook as
[25] is used at the source node. However, instead of mapping the message to the codeword
deterministically as in [25], a stochastic encoder is used at the source node. In this encoder, the
codewords are randomly binned into several bins. The size of each bin is 2NI(X;Yr|Xr) where
N is the total number of channel uses. The message W determines which bin to use by the
encoder. The actual transmitted codeword is then randomly chosen from the bin according to a
uniform distribution. This randomness serves to confuse the eavesdropper at the relay node at
the cost of the rate as shown by the term −I (X ; Yr|Xr) in (61).
We next extend this result by considering a relay channel with a jammer defined by
p(Yr, Y |X,X2, Xr) (63)
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where X2 is the signal transmitted by the jammer and the notation Y, Yr, X,X2 follows the
definition above. Then, if the jammer transmits an i.i.d. signal according to distribution p(X2)
and p(X,X2, Xr) = p(X)p(X2)p(Xr), the induced channel p(Yr, Y |X,Xr) is given below
p (Yr, Y |X,Xr) =
∑
X2
p (X2) p (Yr, Y |X,X2, Xr) (64)
and it is also a memoryless relay channel. Hence, we can use Theorem 3 and obtain the following
corollary:
Corollary 1: The following secrecy rate is achievable:
0 ≤ R ≤ max
p(X)p(X2)p(Xr)p(Y,Yr|X,X2,Xr)p(Yˆr |Yr,Xr)
[
I
(
X ; Y Yˆr|Xr
)
− I (X ; Yr|Xr)
]+ (65)
with
I(Xr; Y ) > I(Yˆr; Yr|Y Xr) (66)
We next reformulate our channel in figure 1 in a way such that Corollary 1 can be applied.
This is shown in Figure 12. Here we can draw the jammer and the receiver separately, since the
jammer does not use the signal received in the past to compute the jamming signal. The m′ and
n′ are the parameters of the schedule described in Section III. We then observe Figure 12 can
be viewed as a three node relay network with a jammer, defined as follows:
p (Y,Yr|X,X2,Xr) (67)
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where
Y =
{
Y m
′
2 , X
n′
2
}
(68)
Yr = Y
n′
1 , X = X
n′
1 (69)
Xr = X
m′
r , X2 = X
n′
2 (70)
The input distributions to this vector input channel are chosen as
p(Xn
′
1 , X
n′
2 , X
m′
r ) = p(X
n′
1 )p(X
n′
2 )p(X
m′
r ) (71)
where p(Xn′1 ), p(Xn
′
2 ) and p(Xm
′
r ) are given below:
1) Let Xn′1 ∼ N (0, P ′1In′×n′), where P ′1 is the average power consumption of node 1 during
the periods of phase one. Hence 0 < P ′1 < P1.
2) Let the auxiliary random variable in compress-and-forward Yˆr be Yˆ n′1 . Let Yˆ n′1 = Y n′1 +Zn′Q ,
where Zn′Q ∼ N (0, σ2cIn′×n′).
3) Let Xm′r ∼ N (0, PrIm′×m′) and Xn′2 ∼ N (0, P2In′×n′).
where In′×n′ denotes an n′ × n′ identity matrix. With 1)-3), we have
I
(
X;YYˆr|Xr
)
(72)
=I
(
Xn
′
1 ; Y
m′
2 X
n′
2 Yˆ
n′
1 |Xm
′
r
)
(73)
=I
(
Xn
′
1 ; Y
m′
2 Yˆ
n′
1 |Xm
′
r X
n′
2
)
+ I
(
Xn
′
1 ;X
n′
2 |Xm
′
r
)
(74)
From (71), I
(
Xn
′
1 ;X
n′
2 |Xm′r
)
= 0. Therefore (74) equals
I
(
Xn
′
1 ; Y
m′
2 Yˆ
n′
1 |Xm
′
r X
n′
2
)
(75)
=I
(
Xn
′
1 ; Yˆ
n′
1 |Xm
′
r Y
m′
2 X
n′
2
)
+ I
(
Xn
′
1 ; Y
m′
2 |Xm
′
r X
n′
2
)
(76)
=I
(
Xn
′
1 ; Yˆ
n′
1 |Xm
′
r Y
m′
2 X
n′
2
)
+ I
(
Xn
′
1 ;Z
m′
2 |Xm
′
r X
n′
2
)
(77)
=I
(
Xn
′
1 ; Yˆ
n′
1 |Xm
′
r Y
m′
2 X
n′
2
)
(78)
(78) equals:
I
(
Xn
′
1 ; Y
n′
1 + Z
n′
Q |Xm
′
r Y
m′
2 X
n′
2
)
(79)
=I(Xn
′
1 ;X
n′
1 +X
n′
2 + Z
n′
1 + Z
n′
Q |Xm
′
r , X
m′
r + Z
m′
2 , X
n′
2 ) (80)
=I
(
Xn
′
1 ;X
n′
1 +X
n′
2 + Z
n′
1 + Z
n′
Q |Xn
′
2
)
(81)
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=I
(
Xn
′
1 ;X
n′
1 + Z
n′
1 + Z
n′
Q
)
(82)
=n′C
(
P ′1
1 + σ2c
)
(83)
and
I (X;Yr|Xr) (84)
=I
(
Xn
′
1 ; Y
n′
1 |Xm
′
r
)
(85)
=I
(
Xn
′
1 ;X
n′
1 +X
n′
2 + Z
n′
1 |Xm
′
r
)
(86)
=I
(
Xn
′
1 ;X
n′
1 +X
n′
2 + Z
n′
1
)
(87)
=n′C
(
P ′1
1 + P2
)
(88)
and
I (Xr; Y) (89)
=I
(
Xm
′
r ; Y
m′
2 , X
n′
2
)
(90)
=I
(
Xm
′
r ; Y
m′
2
)
(91)
=m′C (Pr) (92)
and
I
(
Yˆr; Yr|Y,Xr
)
(93)
=I
(
Yˆ n
′
1 ; Y
n′
1 |Y m
′
2 X
n′
2 X
m′
r
)
(94)
=I
(
Y n
′
1 + Z
n′
Q ; Y
n′
1 |Xn
′
2 X
m′
r Z
m′
2
)
(95)
=I(Xn
′
1 +X
n′
2 + Z
n′
1 + Z
n′
Q ;X
n′
1 +X
n′
2 + Z
n′
1 |Xn
′
2 , X
m′
r ) (96)
=I(Xn
′
1 +X
n′
2 + Z
n′
1 + Z
n′
Q ;X
n′
1 +X
n′
2 + Z
n′
1 |Xn
′
2 ) (97)
=I
(
Xn
′
1 + Z
n′
1 + Z
n′
Q ;X
n′
1 + Z
n′
1
)
(98)
=n′C
(
P ′1 + 1
σ2c
)
(99)
In (75) (81) (87) (91) (97) (98), we use (71) repeatedly, which says that with compress-and-
forward, the input distribution are chosen such that Xn′1 , Xn
′
2 , X
m′
r are independent.
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Substituting the values of I
(
X;YYˆr|Xr
)
, I (X;Yr|Xr), I (Xr; Y) and I
(
Yˆr; Yr|Y,Xr
)
into
Corollary 1, dividing both sides by m′ + n′, and taking the limit m′ + n′ →∞, we proved the
theorem.
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